Trust model›
Every UMF artifact carries cryptographic provenance end-to-end. Compliance posture becomes a property of the system — true because the artifacts are signed and reproducible, not because someone filled out a checklist.
Trust by construction.
Signed images
Every layer carries a signature. A registry serving an unsigned or modified artifact gets rejected by the runtime — no skip-verification flag exists.
Verifiable provenance
Anyone consuming an image can verify what built it, when, with what dependencies. Provenance metadata travels with the artifact.
Build reproducibility
Same input graph, same output bytes — across builders, machines, time. Air-gap and sovereign deployments become tractable.
End-to-end signature chain
From source through every build stage to the running kernel — each layer signed by the builder, verified at each hop.
Audit trail
Every change to declared state is logged, attributed, and queryable. Compliance auditors get answers, not synthesised reports.
No skip-verification
The runtime refuses to load unverified artifacts. There is no flag, no env var, no documented workaround. Verification is structural.